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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study 1b to explore the relation-

ship between intelligence level and memory on concept

attainment tasks where varying amounts of information are
given about the relevant attributes.
The process of concept attainment has beoome the focal

point of intensive research activity on an increasingly

greater scale.

This development reflects the importance

accorded the role of concept attainment in the process of

adapting to our environment.

Heidbreder (1947) has expressed

this thought in the following words:

"It thereby places

conceptual activity among the important means by which the

human organism incorporates into itself through individual
learning and acculturation, novel modes of reaction which

become effeotive determinants not only of its motor be-

havior and symbolic activity, but of the very way in which
it lays hold perceptually on the environment, physical and

social, in which it lives and upon which it operates."
This introduction will be concerned with

1)

the nature of

concepts, 2) the manner in which they are attained, and
3)

the relationship between this process and some of the

potent variables that govern its course.

8

Concepts and Concept Attainment
The functional role of concepts is vital to a success-

ful interaction with our environment.

They allow us to

face a constant stream of incoming stimuli without being

overwhelmed by them; they allow us to order the world in
a consistent way so that we don't have to react to each

event as if it were a unique experience requiring a unique
response; they make it possible for us to make predictions;
and they provide a means of cheeking "what goes with what."

Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin <1956) have proposed a

definition that embodies the above mentioned functions.

According to them, a concept is a "network of sign signifioate inferences by which one goes beyond a set of observed

criterial properties exhibited by an object or event to the
class identity of the object or event in question, and then
to additional inferences about other unobserved properties
of an object or event."

Vinacke (1952) has suggested a definition in terms
of the so-called dynamic theory of cognition.

It views

the concept as "a kind of organization of a person which

links previous experience and current states with stimulus objects.

Concepts are organized systems which have

Important structural relations with each other and which

have dynamic function in determining the on-going course
of thought."

One of the objectives of the dynamic theory

between the
of cognition is to emphasize the distinction
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name of the ooncept and the concept Itself.

Vlnacke points

out that the usual definition tends to regard words as

concepts rather than recognizing that they are names given
to internal cognitive systems after the relevant mental

processes have occurred*
la contrast to those Investigators who have attempted
to make a clear demarcation between conceptual activity

and perception, Heldbreder (1952) has sought to establish
a relationship between them.

She states that "concepts

refer to selected aspects of as well as to extensions beyond

perceived things and perceived situations."

Implicit in

this position is the assumption that this conceptual mode
of functioning Is derived from and is a development of

that involved in the perception of concrete things.

Thus,

it might be possible to view ooncept attainment in terms
of a continuum where a perception becomes a symbol when it

is caught up in a larger organization in which the func-

tional center is shifted further from the concrete and

receptive toward the abstract and constructive.

In support

of this thesis, Heldbreder (1945) ran a study in which the

subjects were presented with a series of objects and designs which they had to identify.

The concepts to be

attained included concrete objects, spatial forms, colors,
and numbers.

The results demonstrated that concepts were

attained in a definite order, positively correlated with
the degree of "thing" character attributed to the features

of their stimuli:

concepts of concrete objects were

attained first, ooncepts of spatial forms next, then concepts of colors, and concepts of numbers last.

Heidbreder, however, is not alone in noting this
phenomenon.

Expanding on a term used by Katz (1935) to

refer to the impress ivoness of colors, Bruner has acknowledged the possibility that preferred cues take on an

"elngreundlich" quality,

Aooording to Bruner, in oonoept

attainment experiments using such meaningless attributes
as color and shape, the attributes that denote the concept

seem to take on a prominence or figural character while
the others seem to recede in figural value.

Heidbreder

(1946, 1947) later replicated her results in studies in

which the stimulus material and perceptual character of
the instanoes were varied.

In another study (1948), the

opportunity for object conceptualization was minimized.
The results supported the hypothesis "that at both the per-

ceptual and intelligence levels the concepts were attained
more or less readily as the criterial features of the
instance were more or less thing like and thus identifiable
by reactions more or less closely resembling those involved
in perceiving concrete objects.

1

*

(1948a),

Heidbreder went

on to investigate whether the order of attainment broke

down and if so, under what conditions.

She found that

where concept formation was able to take place on a more

peroeptual level and where only minimal demands were made
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on the organism, concepts were attained in a random
order.

These results led Heidbreder (1947) to conclude
that
M

as the conditions decrease or increase situational
sup-

port for the appropriate conceptual act they become
more
or less taxing in the sense of drawing more or less
heavily

upon the organism* s contribution - on its reactive
resources
such as remembering, interpretation, and various
symbolic
and constructive processes by which the organism is
capable

of supplementing and reorganizing situations he apprehends

perceptually; that as conditions become more or less taxing, the concentrated tasks they impose become more or

less difficult in the sense of requiring the organism to

overcome more or less resistance as it departs more or
less widely from preferred, perceptual modes of activity.*

Bruner et al. (1956) believe that the attainment of
concepts involves the construction of "rules of grouping"
that correspond to different types of concepts.

tinguish between three types of concepts:

1)

They dis-

conjunctive

concept - consists of the joint presenoe of appropriate

values of several attributes; 2) disjunctive concept

-

lacks

any apparent relationship between its attributes which can

substitute for one another} 3) relational category - defined
by a specifiable relationship between defining attributes.
Thus, there are different types of rules for grouping a set
of attribute values that correspond to differences among

concepts.

Implicit in this approach is a decision making

process in which earlier decisions affeot the degrees of

freedom possible for later decisions.

Regularities or

patterns of decision In the acquisition, retention, and

utilization of information are known as strategies.

In a

learning situation, strategies often provide a systematic

means of handling information rather than allowing the
learner to lapse into a haphazard and inefficient mode of
operation.

Through the use of strategies, the individual

can formulate hypotheses about what is going on in the

learning situation.

According to Bruner et al. (1956),

there are two main strategies!

a)

the focus or wholiBt

strategy which bases the initial hypothesis on the first
positive instance and then alters or maintains It In the
light of subsequent instances encountered, and b) the

scanning or p artist strategy which maintains a particular

hypothesis until it is infirmed by an instance and then
refers back to all instances previously met and makes the

necessary modifications.
The existence of two dominant strategies raises the

question of their relative attractiveness and effectiveness.

In a study designed to investigate these questions,

Bruner et al. (1956) informed their subjects as to the
number of attributes, the number of their corresponding
values, and the fact that the answer was a conjunctive ooncept.

The subjects were asked to write down their best

guess of the concept after being exposed to each card and
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then to cover up their guess so that reference could not
be made to them.

The results showed that the wholist

strategy was the preferred one.

The experimenters con-

cluded that this was due to two reasons: 1) when the
number
of attributes to be dealt with is relatively limited, a

person may be willing to deal with them all at once and
2)

in view of the material used (circles, squares, etc.),

it is unlikely for subjects to have any strong preferences

about the relevance of particular attributes.

However,

these two explanations do not really offer a sufficient

reason for the relative attractiveness of the wholist
strategy.

In answer to the more significant question con-

cerning the relative effectiveness of both strategies, the
authors reply that "because the appropriate scanning follow-

up to a partial hypothesis is more mnemonic ally and inferentially demanding than the foouslng follow-up to an initial
whole hypothesis, the former strategy may be considered

more vulnerable to all those conditions that would make
record keeping difficult.

tt

This advantage existed at all

levels of task difficulty.

For example, as the number of

attributes in the instance increased at a rapid rate, the
f ocusser was not as likely to get confused in remembering

his hypothesis as the scanner was in recalling past instances.
The presence of a time strain also demonstrates the
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advantage of the wholist strategy,

in a study (Austin,

Brunei*, and Seymour, 1953) whioh contrasted relaxed condi-

tions where the subjects worked at their own pace with the

ten second presentation period in the above study, the
same strategy emerged.

Without time pressure and proceed-

ing at their own pace, wholist and partists do equally wellj
but, with time pressure, 63$ of the problems done by the

whollsts were solved while only 31# of the problems done

by the partists were solved.
The importance of the relative frequenoy of positive
and negative instanoes in concept attainment tasks has also

been extensively studied.

It would seem that a large

number of negative instances (one not exemplifying the
ooncept being sought) places a strain on inference capacity and memory, regardless of whether the instance con-

firms or infirms the hypothesis in question.

After much

investigation, Smoke (1952) indicated that negative

instances are inefficient in the learning of concepts:
"the experimental results furnish no statistical signifi-

cant evidence to the effect that ooncept learning proceeds

either more or less rapidly when the series contains both
positive and negative instances than when it contains only

positive,"

In another study (1935) that utilized a simul-

taneous presentation, Smoke obtained the same result.

However, he did find that negative instances tended to

discourage "snap judgments'* and to Increase accuracy more
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than when learning took place from positive instances
This would seem to suggest that negative instanoes

alone,

play some role in the attainment of concepts albeit, at
the moment, an unknown one*

While Smoke minimized the importance of negative
instances in learning a concept, Hovland criticized his

procedure on the grounds that it did not control for the

information content of the two series,

Hovland and Weiss

(1953) equated the information content and number of in-

stances so that any differences in learning the concepts
could be attributed to "differences in difficulty of assimi-

lating information concerning what the concept is" as
compared with assimilating information concerning what it
"is not,"

They found that the correct concept was attained

by a significantly higher percentage of subjects when transmitted

toy

stances.

all-positive instances than

toy

all-negative in-

In a second experiment, they found that mixed

positive and negative instances were intermediate between
all positive and all negative series in difficulty of

learning.

The results also showed that when negative

instances are displayed simultaneously the accuracy of

concept attainment is higher than when they are attained
under successive presentation.
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Memory and Concept Attainment
One of the most important things about storing informa-

tion in the mind is the effect it has on our ability to
reoapture it for later use.

The basis of this ability

rests on the organizing of Information that is assimilated
into the mind*

If Information is to be recoverable for

service in a particular task such information must be

organized in a context related to the task.

In experi-

mental designs used to study the relationship between
concept attainment and memory, the important issue should

not be the recalling of a particular object but, rather,
the making use of information it transmits about the con-»
cept.

This question raises several problems concerning

the criteria to be used.

Hunt (1961) has suggested that

"if the location of a particular instance related to the

instance presented before it or intervening between it and
the point at which the subject's hypothesis is offered

influences the tendency of the subject to offer hypotheses

consistent with this instance, we can infer memory for
information transmitted."
In an experiment by Hovland and Cahill (1960), a

series of negative instances were used to study the role
of memory in the acquisition of concepts.

Each instance

was removed after presentation while in the control group

each one remained after presentation.

The subjects were

told what dimensions were involved, how many were relevant,

and the number of values for each dimension (attribute).

Memory effects were studied by comparing the number of
cases where the guess was incompatible with Information

presented in the prior instance under the two conditions.
The results showed that guesses were seldom Incompatible

with instance* Just presented but, under the experimental
condition, they were increasingly discrepant from instances

further removed from the original instance.

These errors

increased progressively with an increasing number of Inter-

vening Instances thus yielding an approximately linear

forgetting curve,

Hovland and Cahill offer two explana-

tions for their resultst 1) it is possible that the

material presented earlier is attended to more closely
and is somehow more prominent, 2) it may be that at the

outset, fewer instances must be considered while later

more instances have to be considered and remembered in
drawing inferences, and this leads to confusion.

The

authors conclude that if realistic conditions of concept

learning are to be simulated, future studies will have to
use situations where knowledge of the type of concept to

be presented is quite incomplete and also where there is
typical human fallibility of memory.

Hunt (1961) Investigated the use of Information that
is transmitted by a particular instance as a function of

its position in a series of concept defining instances.

His results are essentially a replication of those of
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Hovland and Cahill;

namely, an Interference effect was

found for instances intervening between information trans-

mitting instances and the beginning of the test series.

A

linear relationship for the number of errors In identification of the instances following the presentation of the

information bearing instance increased aa the number of
Instances between this Information bearing instance and
the test series increased.

An interesting but statis-

tically non- significant result was that the number of errors

decreased with an increase in the number of instances pre-

ceding the key instance.

This would seem to Indicate that

the number of these Instances dldn»t have a strong effect

on the subject 1 s ability to retain information.

The importance of set in the learning and retention
Of concepts was studied by Reed (1946)

.

His material

oonsisted of 42 cards that had nonsense syllables on the
back: and

English words on the front, one of which belonged

to a category represented by the syllable.

The task was

to learn the names of the cards and discover the category

for which the syllable stood.

He found that a set to learn

meanings aa well as names yields a higher rate of learning,
a greater degree of retention, and a much larger number of

logical concepts than a set to learn names only.

Heed

also found that concepts that were logically formed are

learned more quickly and better remembered than those
illogically formed.

In a later experiment utilizing the
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same procedures, the results indicated a slight inverse

relationship between the amount of retention of concepts and
the complexity of the stimuli from which they were derived.

The demand that a particular task places on one»s

memory governs, to a considerable extent, the choice of
strategy.

For example, in a memory oriented task, the

partlst-scanner makes more demands on his memory than does
the whollst f ocusser. The focusser bypasses modifications
at each step to assimilate the new information acquired

from the instance he has enoountered.

Thus, he need not

reoall past hypotheses or relationships between them because his present hypothesis is a summary of these.

On

the other hand, the scanner must rely on his memory of past

instances whenever his hypothesis is infirmed by an instance,

Yntema and Meuser (1960, 1962) investigated the
difficulty of keeping track of the current state of several
variables in a study that had no reference to concept
attainment.

The task was to remember the present state of

several variables.

The subject read a series of messages;

each one informed him about the state of one of the variables.

He recorded them in such a way that he could not

see them once he had written them.

At random intervals,

a series of messages was interrupted and he was asked to

recall what the last message about one of the variables
had been.

The results indicated that the probability of
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an error in Identifying the state of a variable increases

with an increase in the number of messages since the last
message (about that variable).

A rather obvious finding

was that subjects kept better track of slowly changing
situations than of rapidly changing ones,

Sperling (I960) used lettered stimuli in an attempt
to study the quantitative amount of information available
to a subject after brief exposure.

In one experiment, the

subject was required to report immediately only a particular part of the stimuli after its visual presentation.

For

all subjects and for all stimuli, the available information

calculated from the partial report

is greater than that

contained in the immediate memory span.

It was found that

two or three times more information is available for par-

tial reports than for whole reports in which the subject
is required to report as much as possible of the entire

stimulus.

However, information in excess of the whole

report is available for only a fraction of a second following exposure.

Employing psychophysical measures, phenomeno-

logical reports, and the above results, Sperling based his

explanation on the appearance of a subjective image or sensation induced by the light flash (of the apparatus) which

outlasted the physical stimulus.

Stimulus Information is

thus stored for a fraction of a second as a persisting

image of the objective stimulus.

As the image fades, its

content decreases and the accuracy of reports based on it
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decreases.

This writer would like to indicate that these

results should be regarded with caution since only five
subjects were used.

A recent study by Kates and Yudin (1964) provides the
closest observation of the relationship between memory and
strategy,

A successive, focus -successive, and simultaneous

method of presentation was employed.

The strategy of the

subjects was classified into thre8 categories:

1)

Ideal

strategy in which the subjects maintained their previous

presented hypothesis upon encountering confirming instances
and changed them upon encountering inf inning instances;
2) Compatible strategy in

which the subjects offered strategy

that was compatible with a presented instance but not com-

patible with all previously presented instances;

3)

Incom-

patible strategy In which the subject changed his previously

presented hypothesis on encountering a confirming instance
and maintained the hypothesis upon encountering infirming

instances.

The findings indicate that those subjects who

were exposed to the successive method of presentation
required a greater number of Instances to attain the concept than the subjects with the f ocus-sucGessive presentation; these latter subjects required a significantly

greater number of instances to attain the concept than
subjects receiving the successive -simultaneous presentation of instances.

With regard to differences in froquenoy

of strategy, subjects in the successive conditions followed
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significantly fewer Compatible and Ideal strategies and
signif ioantly more Incompatible strategies than subjects
in either the focus -sxiocessive or successive -simultaneous

groups.

While the difference between the foovis- successive

and simultaneous -successive groups was in the expected

direction, it was not significant (the successive-simultaneous group followed more Compatible and Ideal strategies

than Incompatible ones).

Information and Concept Attainment
In most of the experiments on concept attainment,
the

subjects have been informed of the number of attributes
to be used and the number of values that each one
possessed.

There have been no studies in whloh the subjects were
offered

information concerning both relevant and irrelevant attributes before the task was actually presented.

Research in

this area has dealt mainly with the effects of irrelevant

attributes on concept attainment.
Archer, Bourne, Brown (1961), in a two part study,

presented the subjeots In one experimental condition with
problems that contained two bits of relevant information
and one to three bits of irrelevant information; and, in

the second condition, presented problems with two bits of

relevant information, one to five bits of irrelevant infor-

mation and Instructions to use an analytical approach.
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They found that performance in conoept formation
decreased
as a positive exponential function of irrelevant
informa-

tion.

In other words, the effect of increased
amounts of

Information was to increase the number of errors in
what
was probably an exponential function.

Also, the results

indicated that the analytical instructions did not
increas
the over-all performance of the analytically
oriented
groups, Gonaazano and Grant (1958) noted that by inter-

mittently reinforcing various irrelevant attributes
the
difficulty of sorting for others increased.

Intelligence and Concept Attainment
It Is a widely accepted belief that there
exists an

intimate relationship between intelligence and
conceptualization.

The importance that is accorded intelligence is

reflected in the use of conceptual tasks In intelligence
tests and in the tendency of many theorists to
include it
in their list of primary mental abilities.

depth of the relationship is unknown.

Still, the

Much of the experi-

mental work in this area has dealt with oonoept
formation
in children.

As such, it is liable to confounding by the

chronological age factor; It would be unwise to extrapolate these results to adult learning situations.

How-

ever, in many studies, the results are worthy
of note.

Hoffman (1953) administered the Weohsler-Bellevue

Scale for Adolescents and Adults to subjects ranging from
twelve to seventeen years of age.

On the basis of these

scores he divided his subjects into a Subnormal group,
50-85; an Average group, 86-115; and a Superior group,

115 and up.

Using geometric designs for tost material and

concepts suoh as Bise, symmetry, depth, and solidity as
tasks, he obtained evidence of a positive correlation

between scores on conceptual problems and intelligence
test groups in the Subnormal and Superior groups, but not
in the Average groups.

Another interesting finding was

the fact that there was a closer relationship between

scores on concept problems versus verbal IQ scores than

between concept problems versus non-verbal IQ scores,

Hoffman offered a provocative explanation of the heterogeneity of scores in the Average group.

He pointed out

that there were more similarities between individuals

located at high and low points of the intelligence scale
than at the middle of it.

Thus, we must appreciate the

fact that when we use the term "average" with reference
to individual intellectual functioning, the average in-

dividual tends to be outstanding at some phases of mental
activity and inefficient in others.
In an interesting series of experiments, 03ler and

Fival (1960) used WISC scores to group 6, 10, and 14 year
olds into two levels of intelligence, Average and Above

Average,

In one group the IQs ranged from 90 to 109, and
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in the second group, the IQs extended upwards from a base
of 110.

Using simple stimuli such as birds and animals

as concepts, they found that intelligence was associated

with significantly different performances in terms of
errors to criterion and number of successful subjects.

When they divided the subjects into sudden and pradual
learners on the basis of their learning curves, the frequency of sudden learners was a function of intelligence.

Osier and Pival concluded that for this group this was
evidence for an association between intelligence and con-

cept attainment by hypothesis testing rather than the
continuity theory of learning.

Osier and Trautman (1961) attempted to follow up this
result with the same age levels and similar IQ groupings*

Thej reasoned that if hypothesis testing is more frequent
among superior than normal subjects, it should be possible
to influence the performance of the Superior group by

varying the number of irrelevant attributes on which

hypotheses can be based.

For subjects of normal intelli-

gence, who tend to achieve solutions by the gradual build up
of an S-R association, no systematic relationship between

the number of stimulus attributes and speed of solution

was anticipated (this, though, in itself is a questionable

assumption).

$hey presented their subjects with two ver-

sions of the same concept:

one in which the irrelevant

dimensions were easy to perceive, and one in which the
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authors assumed the diversity of shape, size, color and

context would suggest more hypotheses.

A breakdown of the

data resulted in a significant interaction between Intelligence and method of concept representation*

The authors

suggest that this is due to the f aot that the Above Average
subjects found the version with multiple irrelevanoies more

difficult than the less diversified versionj while the
subjects of normal intelligence found both types of stimuli

equally difficult.

With the difficult version, the Above

Average subjects lost all advantage of high intelligence,
an advantage that was present in the easier version.

How-

ever, it should be noted that the stimuli used were of a

very simple nature and that these results might not hold

for more complex problems.
In a later study (1962) in this series, Osier and

Weiss examined the influence of instructions on conceptual
performance in two levels of intelligence.
6,

Again dividing

10, and 14 year old subjects into an Average and Above

Average group, she used two different sets of instructions,
an explicit and a vague set of instructions.

The position

the authors took was that "Above Average subjects supple-

ment the E's instructions with their own directing them to
search for consistencies in reinforcing stimuli; whereas
less intelligent subjeots work along without self -instruc-

tions until the reinforcing contingencies of the experiment

strengthen the response to the concept exemplars,"

Thus,
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according to Osier and Weiss, under vague Instructions,
there Is a "problem finding" as well as a "problem solving"

phase to a task.

The results show that under non-specific

instruction, superior intelligence was associated with
more effective concept attainment but, under explicit

instructions, subjects of Average intelligence improved

while the Above Average subjeots did not change.

This led

the experimenters to conclude that the vague instances gave

Above Average subjects an advantage only in the "problem

finding" phase of the task.

However, again it should be

noted that with more complex stimuli and tasks, intelligence might also be an advantage in the "solution" phase
of the task.

STATEMENT

CEP

THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this study Is to explore the relationships between Intelligence level and memory in concept attain-

ment tasks where varying amounts of information are given
about the relevant attributes*

Several research Investigations have established the
existence of the above relationships.

However, very few

studies have simulated conditions that more nearly approxi-

mate the typical everyday learning situations where

individual differences in ability and knowledge are the
rule rather than the exception.

This study is an attempt

to abstract these conditions for additional investigation.

Thus, we will be able to note the way in which exposure
of relevant information previous to the task will affect

the performance of subjects across levels of Intelligence.

By contrasting their performance with subjects of similar
intelligence who receive no Information, we will be able
to observe whether such Information helps problem solving

efforts.

It will also permit us to investigate whether

the person of average intelligence who has certain factual

information can perform as well as a person of high
22
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intelligence who possesses no detailed information.

Another issue we shall be investigating is the relationship between memory and concept attainment under these

conditions.

Most memory studios have relied on straight

reporting, recognition , or problem solving behavior after
exposure to the task.

However, such situations are often

far removed from the typical everyday learning situation.
In a way, this study is analagous to observing the in-

dividual who comes into a learning situation where information may or may not be available and where memory may or

may not be a factor in attaining a solution*

HYP0TH3SE8
The No Memory Group will

problems and

b)

a)

solve significantly more

will require significantly fewer

instances to solve them than the Memory Group,
The information Group will

a)

solve significantly more

problems and b) will require significantly fewer
instances to solve them than the Ho Information Group,
The High, Middle, Low Intelligence Groups will

a)

solve

more conceptual problems and b) will require fewer
Instances to do so, in that order.
The following interactions with respect to the number
of problems solved will be significant:
a)

Memory x Information

- there

will be a greater

discrepancy between the performance of the

Memory and No Memory Groups when information is
not given than when information is given.
b)

Memory x Intelligence - there will be a greater
discrepancy between the different levels of
intelligence in the Memory condition than in
the No Memory oondition; the Low Intelligence
Ss will be helped more than the High Intelli-

gence Ss by the No Memory condition.
24

o)

Intelligence x Information - there will be a

greater discrepancy between the different levels
of intelligence in the No Information condition

than in the Information condition; Low Intelligence Sa will be helped more than the High

Intelligence Ss by the Information condition,
d)

Memory x Information x Intelligence

-

Low Intel-

ligence Ss will be helped in conceptual attain-

ment more than High Intelligence Ss by less need
to rely on Memory and by greater information.

The following interactions with respect to the number
of instances required to solve the problems will be

significant:
a)

Memory x Information

the difference between

-

the Memory and No Memory Groups will be greater

when information is not given than when information is given,
b)

Memory x Intelligence

m

there will be a greater

discrepancy in performance between the different levels of intelligence in the Memory

condition than in the No Memory condition;
the Low Intelligence Ss will be helped more

than the High Intelligence Ss by the No Memory
,

o)

condition.

Intelligence x Information # there will be a
greater discrepancy between the different levels
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of intelligence in the No Information
condi-

tion than in the Information condition;
Low
Intelligence Ss will be helped more than the

High Intelligence Ss by the Information condition.
d) Memory x Information x Intelligence Low Intel-

ligence Ss will be helped in conceptual attain-

ment more than High Intelligence Ss by less
need to rely on Memory and by greater information.

METHOD
Subjeots:

One hundred twenty male and female undergraduates

from an introductory psychology course at the University of
Massachusetts served as subjects in this study.

The subjects

were divided into three levels of intelligence, High,
Middle, and Low, on the basis of scores attained on the

Scholastic Aptitude Test of the College Boards Examination.
This division yielded a High Intelligence Group of 40 subjects that averaged in the seventy-sixth percentile on

both Quantitative and Qualitative parts of this test; a
Middle Intelligence Group of 40 subjects that averaged in
the fifty-sixth percentile on the Quantitative and fifty-

third percentile on the Qualitative} and a Low Intelligence

Group of 40 subjects that averaged in the forty-fifth and
fortieth percentile on the Quantitative and Qualitative,
respectively.

These subjects were then divided equally

into two conditions of task presentation, Simultaneous and

Successive,

Within each of these two task conditions,

there was a further breakdown into two conditions of infor-

mation presentation, Detailed Information and No Detailed
Information,
,

Thus, altogether there were four groups of

30 subjeots (including 10 subjects from each intelligence

27
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Table 1

Experimental Procedure

Condition

IQ Division

High IQ (10 Ss)
Memory - Information

(30 Ss)
(F = 18

Mid. IQ (10 Ss)

LoW

IQ (1 ° SS)

High IQ (10 Ss)
No Memory - Information

(30 Ss)

Mid. IQ (10 Ss)

5* ~
(p ss 18

Low

IQ (10 Ss)

High IQ (10 Ss)

Memory - Ho Information

(30 Ss)
[f I 18

Mid. IQ (10 Ss)

LoW

IQ (1 ° 86)

High IQ (10 Ss)
No Memory - No Information (30 Ss)
(M = 12

Mid. IQ (10 Ss)

Low

IQ

(

10 Ss )
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level) with each group exposed to just one of the following experimental conditions:

Memory-Inf ormation, Memory-

No Information, No Memory -Information and No Memory-No

Information.

The aame ratio of females to males, three to

two, was maintained in each of these four conditions.

Materials :

A set of twelve problems was constructed on

cards using the following attributes:
and number.

Shape, color, outline,

Some of the problems consisted of instances that

had a top and bottom part, and some had parts that consisted
of just one line.

An example of an Instance of the first

type of problem would be a red cross, blue circle, and

yellow square on top and a red star and green star on the
bottom; an example of an Instance of the second type would
be a blue cross, green square, and red diamond.

Each prob-

lem contained either seven or eight instances, one or two
of which were negative (not containing the sought after

concept)

•

The number of instances in each problem con-

tained just so much information so that when the last

instance was encountered there was only one answer remaining.

A positive instance (which contained the appropriate

concept) was indicated by the presence of a plus sign in

front of it and a negative instance was indicated by the
presence of a minus sign.
types of problems.

This feature applied to both

However, if in the case of a top-bottom

type problem, part of the answer was in both the top and

)

30

bottom, two signs were used*

one in front of the top and

one in front of the bottom.

The top and bottom part always

agreed in sign.

These problems were originally constructed

by this investigator and were pilot tested to eliminate the

possibility of multiple answers.

(Each of the problems can

be found in the Appendix in the order in which they were

administered •

Experimental Conditions t

Two versions of each problem were

employed, a No Memory and a Memory oondition.

The former

consisted of a simultaneous presentation in which each new
instance was presented at the same time with all previous
instances on the same card.

Memory condition was in the

form of a successive presentation in which each instance
was exposed in order without any of the preceding instances.

Each instance of a problem was presented on an individual
card.

Examples of a simultaneous presentation of both

types of problem (with all of their instances) are shown
in Figures 1 and 2,

The Information condition was effected in the following way.

One or two attributes relevant to the solution

of the problem were extracted from each problem and printed

on cards; one card for each problem.

For example, such a

card might have the words "color" and "outline" printed on
it if these attributes were relevant to the solution of

that particular problem.

In half of the problems one

attribute was given and in the other half, two attributes

AT
.a

n

Figure 1: Example
of tfr© simultaneous
presentation of a
problem in whioh
eaoh instanoe has
a top and bottom
part*

0

Figure 2s Example of the simultaneous presentation
of a problem in which each instance consists of a
line of figures*
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were offered.

However, in those problems with a top and

bottom part, each figure had the same solid outline so
that outline, as an attribute, was not relevant to the

solution of this type of problem.

Therefore, to prevent

the establishment of any sets, all problems in which out-

line was possibly relevant to the solution were given first

before the problems with top and bottom parts.

Procedure t

The subjects were tested in groups of approxi-

mately six to ten subjects.

Each subject was given an

answer booklet and a cover-up card.

Each page of the book-

let corresponded to a problem and contained enough lines
to match the number of instances in each problem.

The

subjects were asked to write down what they thought the
answer was after each card was presented to them and then
to cover up their guess.

Thus, if there were eight in-

stances to a particular problem, a subject made eight

guesses as to what he thought the answer was, but without

having reference to his previous guesses.

Each instance

of a problem was plaoed in front of the subjects on a ver-

tical stand and exposed for approximately fifteen seconds.
Out of twelve problems that were constructed, three

were used for instruction and nine for actual testing.
The problems were given in what was thought to be an

ascending order of difficulty based on the results of the
pilot testing.

Depending on the experimental condition, the following
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set of instructions were used to acquaint the subject with
the nature of the task:

A set of problems has been constructed using

different geometric figures. The colors,
shapes, borders, and number of these figures
were varied. Each of the problems consists
of many parts.
Some of the puzzles have parts
that have a top and a bottom like this one
(ex. is shown) and some of them have Just one
line like this (ex, is shown). This is only
one part of a problem; and this is what a complete problem looks like (ex. is shown). The
answer to each problem is in the part that has
a plus sign in front of it. When a minus sign
is In front of a part the answer is not in
that part (ex. is shown). Now, it is important
to remember that there is only one answer to
each problem and this same answer, the right
answer is in each part that has a plus sign
in front of it. But the minus part doesn*t
have that answer in It. When you get a problem that has a top and bottom part, the answer
could be in the top or the bottom, or parts of
the answer could be in the top and in the
bottom. If part of the answer is in the top
and the other part in the bottom there will
be two plusses, one in front of the top part
and one in front of the bottom part like this
(ex. is shown).

When the problems with top and bottom parts
were reached, the following instruction was given
to all subjects. "In the remaining problems"
outline "will not be the answer to the problem
nor will it be relevant to finding the solution."
Supplementary Instructions for
Bach Condition
Information -No Memory - since these problems
are difficult, every time I show you a new
instance, I will also show you the instances
that you have already seen before it. I am
also going to give you some hints which should
help you.
;

Inf orm at i on Memory - these problems are very
difficult and whenever I show you a new instance of a problem, you will have to remember
the parts that preceded it.
I am going to
give you some hints which should help you.

No Information-No Memory - since these problems
are difficult, every time I show you a new
instance, I will also show you the instances
that you have already seen before it.
Mo Inf ormat ion -Memory - these problems are very
difficult and whenever I show you a new instance
of a problem, you will have to remember the
parts that preceded it.

Dependent Variables t

To measure each subjeot's efficiency

in problem solving ability, the number of problems he

solved and the number of Instances he required to solve

them were recorded.

This latter measure, number of in-

stances to solution, was computed by totaling up the number
of instances It took for a subject to solve all the prob-

lems and summing this total over subjects in each group and

within each test condition.

Thus, an individual subject *s

score might be obtained in the following way?

if he solved

Problem 1 giving the correct answer after the fifth instance
was exposed, he received a score of five for that problem.

However, if there were seven instances to a problem and a

subject failed to solve it after all the instances had been
exposed, he was assigned a score of eight, one more than
the number of instanoes in that particular problem.

This

was done to distinguish between those subjects who solved
the problem on the very last instance presented and those

who failed to solve it at all.

.

RESULTS
The first hypothesis, part A, was supported by the

results.

The subjects that were exposed to the No Memory

oondition solved significantly

Group (Tables 2 and

4)

.

raore

problems than the Memory

part B of this hypothesis was also

confirmed (Tables 3 and 5),

The No Memory Group required

fewer Instances to solve the problems than the Memory
Group,
The seoond hypothesis, part A, was also supported by
the results.

The subjects that were provided with speci-

fied information solved

s ing if leant ly

more problems than

those subjects who were not given such information (Tables 2
and 4).

Part B of this hypothesis was confirmed when the

Information Group required significantly fewer Instances
to solve the problems than the No Information Group
(Tables 3 and 5)
The third hypothesis, part A, was confirmed by the

superior achievement of the High Intelligence Group relative to that of the Middle and Low Intelligence Groups;
the latter group solved the fewest number of problems.

Part B of this hypothesis was supported by a similar order
of performance with respect to efficiency of problem solving

efforts.
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Table 2

Analysis of Variance for the Number of Problems Solved

sv
Total

dfs

SS

119

569.30

MS

F

p value

1

24.00

24.00

11.11

.005

Inform. (B)

1

175.06

175.06

84.91

.001

Intell. (c)

2

56.00

28.00

13.58

.001

Mem, x Inf. (AB)

1

30.00

30.00

14.80

.001

Mem. x Int.

(AC)

2

21.30

10.60

5.14

.01

Inf. x Int.

(BC)

2

37.40

18.70

9.08

.005

Mem. x Inf. x Int. (ABC) 2

2.54

1.27

.62

223.00

2.06

Memory

(A)

Ss/M x I x I

108
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Table 3

Analysis of Variance for
the Number of Instances to Solution

I

Total

Memory

dfs

SS

119

16807.47

MS

P

p value

1

974.69

974.69

11.47

.001

Inform. (B)

1

3686.03

3586.03

42.23

.001

Intell. (C)

2

2015.82

1007.91

11.87

.001

Mem. x Inf. (AB)

1

.85

.85

.01

Mem. x Int.

(AC)

2

141.06

70.53

.83

Inf. x Int. (BO)

2

850.22

425.11

5.00

ABC)2

68.70

34.35

.40

9170.00

84.90

(A)

Mem. x Int. x Inf.

Ss/ M x I X I

(

108

.01
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Table 4

Means and Standard Deviations of Number
of Problems Solved for the Main Effects

# Solved

Mean.

s.D.

Memory

252

4.2

1.12

No Memory

3X4

5.0

1.28

High Intelligence

226

5,5

1.20

Middle Intelligence

188

4.7

1.05

Low Intelligence

152

3.8

1.10

Information

359

6.0

.97

No Information

207

3» 5

1.27

4G

Table 5

Means and Standard Deviations of Number
of Instances to Solution for the Main Effeots

$ of Instances

Mean

S.D.

Memory

3716

62.0

9.31

No Memory

3433

57.2

8.26

High Intelligence

2152

53.8

11.01

Middle Intelligence

2470

61.7

8.19

Low Intelligence

2526

63.2

8.00

Information

3246

54.1

10.49

No Information

3901

65.0

7.69

41

Turning to the interactions, Hypothesis 4a was confirmed, indicating that the different combinations of

Memory and Information (AB) affected the number of problems solves (Table 6).

A Duncan Range Test was run on the

size of the predicted discrepancy between the No Memory
and Memory Groups when no information was given} it was

significant at the .01 level.

When Information was provided

there was no significant difference between these two groups
(Tables 6 and 7, Figure 3).

One result that raises many

interesting questions was the superiority of the Information-Memory condition over the No Inf orraation-No Memory
condition.

This difference in the number of problems solved

was significant at the ,01 level; and most of the difference
can be traced to the significantly different performances

between the High Intelligence Ss in these two conditions.
The Memory x Intelligence (AC) interaction supports

Hypothesis 4b which predicted that the difference In the
number of problems solved between the levels of Intelligence would increase when Memory became an important factor.

The difference between the various levels of Intelligence
in the Memory condition was significant at the .01 level

(Tables 8 and 9, Figure 4).

The effect of the Memory condi-

tion on the High Intelligence Group was practically nonexistent, whereas the Middle and Low Intelligence Groups

suffered a significant decrease In the number of problems
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Table 6

Means and Standard Deviations of Number of
Problems Solved for the Memory x Information
Interaction

# Solved

Me en

S.p.

171

5,7

1.04

Memory-No Information

81

2.7

1.21

No Memory-Information

188

6.6

.89

No Memory-No Information

126

4.2

1.33

Memory-Information
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Table 7
Results of Duncan Range Tests of the Number of Problems
Solved for the Memory x Information Interaction

No Inf-Mea No Inf-No Mere Inf -Mem Inf-No Mem
Ho Inf-lfiem

No Inf-No Mem

Inf-Men
Inf-No Mem

.01

.01

,01

.01

.01

44

Memory
No Memory

190
180

\

0
IHF

NO INF

Figure 3: The total number of problems
solved by the subjects in the Memory Group
and the No Memory Group in the Information
and No Information condition.
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Table 8

Means and Standard Deviation for Number of Problems
Solved for the Memory x Intelligence Interaction

Means

S.D.

llO

5.5

1.12

Mem-Middle Intell

79

3.9

1.06

Mom-Low Intell

63

3.2

1.10

Ho Mem-High Intell

116

5.8

1.19

No Mem-Middle Intell

109

5.4

1.05

89

4.5

1.11

# Solved
Mem-High Intell

No Mem-Low Intell
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High IQ

------

Mid. IQ

H k

Low

as

ac-at

120

NO MEM

MEM

Figure 4: The total number of problems
solved by High, Middle, and Low Intelligence subjects in the No Memory and Memory
conditions.
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solved (Tables 8 and 9).
The significant Information x Intelligence (BO) inter-

action supports Hypothesis 4c.

However, information helped

aided
the relatively High Intelligence Group more than it
the Middle or Low Intelligence Groups in the number of

problems solved.

The differenoe between High, Middle, and

Low Intelligence in this condition was significant at the
.01 level (Tables 10 and 11, Figure 5).

It should also be

noted that there is no significant differenoe between the

performance of the Low Intelligence Group and the High
Intelligence Group when the former group was provided with

information and the latter group was not given such infor-

mation (Tables 10 and 11)
Contrary to expectation, there was no second order
(ABC) Interaction between the three main effects and

Hypothesis 4d was rejected.

With respect to the presence of interactions on the
second dependent measure, Hypothesis 5a was disconfirmed
by the results.

Thus, the discrepancy in the number of

instances to solution between Memory and Ho Memory did not

increase when information was not given.

However, as was

the oase with this interaction on the first dependent

measure, the Information-Memory Group was also able to
solve the problems more efficiently than the No Information-

No Memory Group.

This difference was Just barely signifi-

difference
cant at the .05 level (Table 13); and most of this
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Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations of the number of Problems
Solved for the Information x Intelligence Interaction

# Solved

Means

S.D.

Ho Inform-High IQ

78

3.9

1.45

Ho Inform-Middle IQ

74

3.7

1.16

Ho Inform-Low IQ

55

2.8

1.20

Inform-High IQ

148

7.4

.95

Inform-Middle IQ

114

5.7

.95

97

4.9

1.01

Inform-Low IQ
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3!

]|

Figure 5; The total number of problems
solved by the High, Middle, and Low
Intelligence subjects in the Information
and No Information conditions.
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Table 12

Means and Standard Deviations of Number of Problems
Solved for All Combinations of Memory, Information,
and Intelligence

# Solved
Inform-No Mem-High IQ

Means

S.P.

78

7.5

.83

Mid

IQ

61

6.1

.84

Low

IQ

52

5.2

1.02

73

7.3

1.07

Inform-Mem-High IQ
Mid

IQ

53

5.3

1.06

Low

IQ

45

4.5

1,00

41

4.1

1.55

No Inform-No Mem-High IQ

Mid

IQ

48

4.8

1.26

Low

IQ

37

3.7

1.20

37

3.7

1.35

No Inf orm*Mem-High IQ

Mid

IQ

26

2.6

1.08

Low

IQ

18

1.8

1.20

53

Table 13

Means and Standard Deviations of
Number of Instanoea t o
Solution for the Memory x Information
Interaction

# of Instanoes

Me ana

S.D.

Memory-Informatioa

1691

56.4

11.41

Memory-No Information

2025

67.3

6.99

No Mem-Information

1555

51,8

9.48

No Memory-No Inform

1878

62.6

8.42
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is due to the significant difference between the High Intel-

ligence Ss in both of these conditions.
The results also failed to confirm Hypothesis 5b, the

Memory x Intelligence (AC) interaction; the difference
between the levels of intelligence in the Memory condition
was not significantly greater than
condition.

that

in the No Memory

One result of this interaction, that was consistent

with the same interaction on the first dependent variable,
was the fact that the High Intelligence Groups did not per-

form significantly different under the No Memory condition.
The Intelligence x Information (BC) interaction on
this dependent measure was also significant, confirming

Hypothesis 5c (Tables 15 and 16, Figure 6).

Its direction

was quite similar to that of the same Interaction on the

first dependent variable, number of problems solved.

How-

ever, although it was significant, the discrepancy between

greatest
the performances of the levels of intelligence was

when information was present than when it was not.

This

the
is, again, a reversal of the predicted location of

greatest discrepancy.

When Information was provided, the

was
difference between High and Middle to Low Intelligence
signifisignificant at the .01 level whereas there was no

when
cant difference in the performance of these groups
also,
information was not given (Tables 15 and 16). Here,
of informawhen Low Intelligence Groups have the advantage
there is no
tion over the High Intelligence Group,
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Table 14

Mean. and standard Deviations
of tha
ot
To solution for th. «a mory
x Xntolli g . no. i n t 9r . otion

# of Instances

Means

S.D.

1108

55.4

11.75

1290

64.5

8.75

1318

65.9

7.12

No Mem-High IQ

1045

52.5

9.73

No Mem-Middle IQ

1108

59.0

7.63

No Mem-Low IQ

1208

60.0

8.94

Mem-High IQ
Men-Middle IQ

Mem-Low IQ
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Table IS

Means and standard Deviations
of the Number of Instances
to
Solution for the Information *
Intell igence Interaction

# of Inst anna a

Means

s.D.

^

No Inform-High IQ

1854

No Inform-Middle IQ

lg84

No Inform-Low I Q

l364

^

8S8

44.9

1S.90

Inform-Middle IQ

ll86

59#3

8<Q4

Inform-Low IQ

1162

^

Inform-High IQ

Q2

^

^
^

f

g

^Q
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Figure 6s The total number of instanoes required
to solve the problems for the High, Middle and
Low Intelligence subjects in the Information and
No Information condition.
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Table 17

and Standard Deviations of
Number of Instances
To Solution for All
Combination, of Memory,
Information, and Intelli gen

»ans

see
<

§ of Instanoaa
Inform-No Mem-High IQ

43.8

10.61

IQ

573

57.3

8.04

IQ

544

54.4

9.«50

460

46.0

15.00

IQ

613

61-3

9.84

IQ

618

61.8

9.41

607

60.7

9.96

Low

Inform-Mem-High IQ

Low

S.p.

458

Mid

Mid

Means

No Inform-No Mem-High IQ
Mid

IQ

607

60.7

7.22

Low

iq

664

66.4

7.97

646

64.3

8.50

No Inform-Mem-High IQ

Mid

IQ

677

67.7

7.66

Low

IQ

700

70.0

5.83

.
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significant difference between them in the
number of
instances needed to solve the problems

Hypothesis 5d,whioh anticipated a second
order interaction (ABC), was again not supported by
the results.
Sex was not considered as a main effect
in
this

design; and an analysis of the data showed
no difference
between the sexes in problem solving ability.

DISCUSSION
The results concerning the three main effects reinforce
the widely held belief that memory, intelligence, and infor-

mation play integral and potent roles in conceptual behavior.
The significantly better performance of the High Intelligence, No Memory, and Information Groups was anticipated

almost by definition alone.

Thus, the obtained confirma-

tion of Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 was not surprising.
The hypothesized success of the No Memory Group mani-

fests how the burden of cognitive strain, because of need
to remember information from previously presented instances,
can interfere with concept forming behavior.

The value of Information as a means of guiding and
organizing one's conceptual activities, anticipated in

Hypothesis 2, was evident in both the Memory and No Memory
conditions.

Information enabled the subjects to bypass

the irrelevant material to reach the more salient relation-

ships between the attributes.

With respect to Hypothesis 3, Highly Intelligent
individuals demonstrated that they are able to organize
and manipulate given information for their own purposes
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in situations where memory is both required
and not required.
Similarly, when no additional information is given,
they
are better able to utilize their intellectual
powers to

seek and sort out the salient oues that will enable
them
not only to solve the problems, but to solve them
at a faster
pace. In their study with six, ten, and
fourteen years old,
Osier and Weiss pointed out the possibility that
the Above

Average individuals may supplement the E's instructions

with their own to search for consistencies in reinforcing
stimuli.

On the other hand, the less intelligent individuals

work along without supplementary self -ins true t ions until
the reinforcing contingencies of the experiment
strengthen
the response to the concept exemplars.

Further evidence

for such hypothesized behavior exists in the fact that
High

Intelligence Ss required fewer instances to solve the problems than the Middle Intelligence subjects, who were
superior
in this respect to the Low Intelligence Ss.

The confirmation of Hypothesis 4a showed that the effeet
of information was greater in the Memory condition than
in

the No Memory condition.

In the Memory condition, it alle-

viated some of the burden and pressure from a subject's

mnemonic devices permitting a faster and more accurate solution of the problems.

When it is recalled that a mild

stress condition was present in the form of a limited period
of exposure to the instances composing a problem, the neces-

sity for rapid, structured processing of data becomes
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readily apparent.

That such stress was present oan be

deduced from the superiority of the No Memory Group over
the Memory Group.

The faot that this superiority was

greatest when information was lacking, rather than when it
was given, suggests that information can help the learner
to focus his mental powers on the more relevant aspects of

a concept.

In addition, these results fit in well with

Kates and Yudin's findings that successive presentation
requires a greater number of instances to attain a concept}
and that having to remember a large amount of information

taxes not only one*s mental energies but also interferes

with the organization and integration of one's symbolic
activities.
An intriguing question connected with this Memory x

Information Interaction is why the subjects in the

Information-Memory Group performed better on both dependent
measures than the No Information -No Memory Group.

What it

seems to suggest is that having access to specified informa-

tion even when memory demands are stringent Is more helpful
in concept attainment than being exposed at any one time to
all the information provided by all the previously exposed

instances; reliance upon memory, in the latter case, is

minimized greatly.

To view it another way, the reliance

upon memory is less of a hindrance than the failure to provide information.

Hints about the correct attribute provide

an anchoring point from which an individual can launch his
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search for the salient values and for
the relationships
between the relevant attributes. In a
memory condition,
a hint serves as a guide, as well as a
focal point around
which one can collect relevant information
and keep it more
oasily in nind because of its more
meaningful relationship
to other information.
If information is to be recoverable
for service in a task, it must be organized
in a context
related to the task. Thus, although there
is added cognitive strain due to the Memory factor, it
is more
than

counterbalanced by the help informational hints
provide by
directing attention to the relevant attributes.
In faot,
the potency of information was further
demonstrated

in this

study, when this condition, Information
-Memory, performed
almost as well as the most favorable condition
for learning,
the Information-No Memory.
Possibly, any inference about
Information versus Ho Memory condition is
speculative because the High Intelligence subjects in
the No InformationNo Memory oonditlon unexpectedly performed below
their

antieipated level.

It is not exaotly clear why the High

Intelligence Group did not perform better than the
Middle
and significantly better than the Low
Intelligence Groups

in the No Information-No Memory condition.

This experi-

menter is inclined to think that it was a chance
happening
and that with a larger number of problems,
the effect of

High Intelligence would have been more apparent.
The poor performance of the No Information-Memory
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Croup demonstrates that „
lthout any
attributes the subject
ceding to rely upon
for
information about previously
presented instsnee., ia
faced
with the task of foxing
ny hypothe.e, from the
myriad of
possibilities that
mac arise out
mi*- «p
..v
of the numerous
permutations
and combinations of the
attributes; he then must
remember
the information previously
presented so that he can
retain
»dify, or reject irrelevent
hypotheses. That such is
probably the case wa. amply
demonstrated by Hovland and
Cahill (l 96 o) and y„tema
and M.u.er (1960,

M

1962)

.

Ia the

first experiment, Hovland
and Cahill used a
similar explanation in .hewing that in
a simultaneous
presentation, guesses
were
incompatible with instance,
juat presented .
However, under the successive
condition they .ere increasingly
di.erepant from Instance,
further removed. The se
errors
increaeed progressively with
an increasing number of
intervening instances. The authors
concluded that at the outset,
rawer instance, must be
considered and remembered in
drawing
inferences, and that the
increasing number of instances
lead
to confusion.
In interna and Beu.ar-s work,
it was found
that the possibility of
error in identifying a state
of
a variable inorea.es
with sn increase in the number
of meesages since the last message
about that variable. Our
explanation ia also in accordance
with Archer. Bourne, and
Brown-. (1961) fi nalng that

„ U-

m

tha

Qf

lmmmm

of information in the form
of combinationa of varying
.mounts

,

6b

of irrelevant and relevant information
is to increase the
number of errors

The highly significant Memory x
Intelligence inter-

action «ith regard to the number of
problems solved, suggests
that the Mo Memory condition was more
helpful for the Middle
and Low Intelligence Groups than
for the High Intelligence

Group.

When memory was not a factor, the
Middle and Low
Intelligence Groups were able to function
at a relatively
high level. However, under memory stress,
the effect of
differential intelligence came to the fore
and the relatively stable performance of the High
Intelligence subjects
under both memory conditions may be taken
as a reflection
of the potency and stability of superior
intelligence.
The

stress upon their memory was not as great
because of their
better methods of storing and retrieving
information.
The significance of the hypothesized (4e)
Information x

Intelligence interaction was overshadowed by the
fact that
the location of the largest discrepancy
between levels of

intelligence was the reverse of that which was
expected.
It was thought that if the No Memory condition
proved to
be more of a help to the Low Intelligence
subjects than the

High Intelligence subjects in the Memory x Intelligence
interaction, then the Low Intelligence Ss would also bene-

fit more than the High Intelligence 3e from the presence
of
information.

However, instead of being consistent with the

confirmed Memory x Intelligence interaction, the High
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Intelligence subjects suffered
the greatest decrease
in
number of problems solved and
in the efficiency with
which
they solved the,,
other words, the supplying
of information apparently aided the High
Intelligence Ss more

m

than

it helped the Low Intelligence
Ss.

Mother interesting

and important result
within the

context of this interaction,
is the finding that the
Low
Intelligence subjects performed
better than the High Intelligenoe subjects when they had
access to specified information that was not available
for the latter group; the Low
Intelligence Group in the Information
condition were better
problem solvers than the High
Intelligence Group in the No
Information condition. These
findings tend to support Osier
and Trautmen's suggestion that
Above Average subjects faced
with proolems, the presentation
of which is based on multiple
irrelevaneies versus a less diversified
version where
things

are more focalized, lose much
of the advantage of High

Intelligence.

Thus, it may be that High
Intelligence Ss

make better use of information that
only hints at the next
steps for organizing and synthesizing
the relevant attributes; but they may suffer a
relatively greater handicap
in the transition to an unstructured
situation.
In another sense, the great increase
in the efficiency

of the High Intelligence Ss also
indicates that they not

only make better use of information,
but that they are more
capable of benefiting from Instructions
than the Middle

and Low Intelligence Ss.
In line with the reasoning
expressed in the above
hypotheses and discussion, a
Memory

x Information * Intel-

Ugence interaction

on both dependent measures
was antici-

pated.

Such an interaction, if
significant, would indicate
that the cognitive strain
imposed by memory requirements
and
lack of information reduces
the conceptual efficiency
of
the Low Intelligence subjects
more than the High Intelligence subjects. However, there
was no such relationship
and each combination tended to
produce the same effect
across levels of intelligence.
At this point, it would be
helpful to stress that, to
an extent, these results are
a function of the problems
used. It is entirely possible
that with another set of
problems, different results would
have been obtained with
the Memory and Information
conditions by the different Intelligence groups.
It is difficult to understand why
the hypothesized

Memory x Information and Memory
* Intelligence interactions
of Hypotheses 5a and 5b were
not supported on the variable
of efficiency of problem solving
efforts. One possible
explanation for the inf irming of the
hypothesized Memory x
intelligence interaction may be that
intelligence in a memory
pressure situation may manifest itself
more readily in the
products of the conceptual process than
in the speed with
which it takes to achieve them.
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g »oe sa was not signif csntly
greater ,hah
lnoMM .
for the High Intelligent
3,
tha Ho Memory to the
Memory
conditio may b. a. follows:
the fact that tha
Low Intelligent Sa averaged
ln.ta„o. 0 out

^
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of .

?6
to solve only an averse
of three of the nine
problem. In
memory
««
condition suggests that many
of these problems
••ere not solved
within the allott.d number
of guess.,.
«han this happened,
a subject was given th. score
of on.
»ore than th. numbor of
Inatanc.s in the problem
that he
had failed. Thus, many
problems that were failed
with in-

creased memory demands were
non.th.less counted as eight
or ni„. instance. The
effect of this method of
scoring
was to reduce th. overell
increaae in th. number of instance, used by the Low
Intelligence subjects from th.
«o Memory oondition to the
Memory condition.
The pattern of the significant
Information x Intelli-

gence interaction (Hypothesis
5o) in term, of th, number
of instsnces required for
solution mirrors that of the one
for number of problem, solved.
It similarly suggests that
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of intelligence, and that
this relative improvement
might
be greatest for Low
Intelligence subjects.
As an example of building
on the results obtained
here '
we might investigate
whether increased amounts
of information are always useful and
if not, at what point
they

become a handicap and source
of confusion.
By glvlng vary _
ing amounts of information
to different levels of
intelligence we can note whether there
is a linear relationship
between the amount of information
and performance on conceptual tasks. Also, it will
enable us to observe in what
way the improvement in
performance of different levels
0f
intelligence is a function of
increasing amounts of infermation. Another approach could
involve the differential

weighting of information in order
to see which level of
intelligence made the most use of
the most salient hints.
One of the relevant areas that
was discussed earlier in the
Introduction warrants consideration
here; that is,
the

relationship between learning conditions
and strategy used.
The wholist strategy is generally
regarded to be the most
effective strategy but it must be asked
whether this efficiency rests on the nature of the strategy,
or its use by
predominantly high intelligence individuals.
This question
has not been answered and its
ramifications for the teaching process are extremely broad.

SUMMARY

»-

Purpose or

m,

study is to explore
th9

»hi P between intelligence
X6Tel rad mMory jn
oonoept
attainment wh9ro Tai7lng
of lnfoMaMon
giTen
about th. relevant
attributes. One hundred
tw.nty Sa B8
oategorls.d aoooralng
Hlgh> Miadie>
ana ware then attributed
lnto four combination,
of m .fflory
and information.
Information-Memory, Inf
ormation-So Memory
»6 Information-Memory, and Ho
Inf ormatio„-No Memory,
subject was exposed to th.
serleE of

^

„

^^

probleM

^

g

manner consistent with the
condition i„ ,hloh „. waB
two dependant variables
. the number of
problems solved and
the number of inatano.s
to solution, .ere
raoorded. It
*"
*h«t Low Intelligence Ss
would benefit most
fro. th. pres.no. o,
information and a no-memory
situation.
The results were somewhat
contradictory, a. Memory
x
Intelligence interaction was
significant in the predicted
direotion, but the significant
Information x Intelligence
interaction was not in the
predicted direction,

^

i.e. th.

High Intelligence subjects
benefited most from the preseno.
of information, one of the
most interesting rcsulta was
the general, overall
potency of detailed information
and
th. support it gave to the
efforts of

Low Intelligence
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subjects when certain handicaps
existed in the learning
situation. The implications of
these findings were discussed in the context of teaching
rules and principles in
learning situations as opposed
to an unstructured, bit
by
bit, amassing of information,
addition, the conflicting
performance of the High Intelligence
Ss raises questions
as to what variables affect
the functioning of this
power.
A start was made in considering
some of these issues by
suggesting new lines of research.

m
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APPENDIX

The sequence that the problems
are In on the following
pages constitutes the order in which
they were administered.
The letters that mark each figure
designate the color of
that figure aocording to this key:
R
G.

. . . .

Y
P

Or
Br
Bl

. .

,

.

red
.green

yellow
purple
orange
.brown
blue

Listen below are the answers to each
problem and the
information that was provided for each one
in the information condition.

Problem
1 (practice)

2 (practice)

Answer
all of the figs,
within an instance
have the same
outlines

each instance
in the problem
has at least one
blue fig. in It

3 (practice)

each instance in
the problem has
a green fig. on
the top and a red
one on the bottom
all of the figs,
within an instance
have different
outlines

Inform ,
outline

top and

bottom oolor

top and

bottom color

outline

each instance in
the problem has
at least one red
fig. in it
each instance in
the problem has
two fig. with the
sane outline

Eaoh instance in
the problem has at
least one dashed
outline in it
each instance in
the problem has at
least two figs,
with the same color
all of the figs, on
the top part of each
instance have the
same color

color

outline

outline

color

top
color

the ratio of the
number of figs, in
the top to the
number of figs, in
the bottom of each
instance is 2:3

number
top and
bottom

eaoh instance in the
problem has at least

top and
bottom color

one fig. in the top
that has the same color
as at least one of the
same figs, in the bottom
all of the figs, within
an Instance have differ-

ent colors.

color

+

H- 4-

-f 4-

+

1

p
u

/

DKCM
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AMINOS OP SUBJECTS ON SCHOLASTIC APTITUDE
TEST OP COLLEGE COARD EXAMINATION

4

High Int.

Middle Int.

Verb.

i^uant.

9
9
7
9
7

8
7

5
5

9
9
9
9
8
9
7
6

S

8
7
6
8
9
7
7
7
6
6
7

8
7
9

8
6
9
7
7
9

8
8
7
7
8
8
7
7
8
7
8
6

8

Meani 7.6
S.D.
.995

8
8
8
9
9

8
7
8
6

7
9
6

8
8
6
7
6
7
7
6
7
9
9
7
8

8
8
7

7.6
1.02

Verb.

5
6
5
6
6
6
5
5
6
6

5
5
6
6
5
6
6
5
5
5
5
6
5
5
5

5
5

4
6
5
6
6
4
6
5
5
4

5.3
. 57

Quant.
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
5
5

6
6
5

5
6
6
5
5
6
S
5
6

Low Int.
Verb.
4

5

3

5

4

5

3

4

5
5

4
4
4
4
4
5

3
3
3
4
3
4
4
4
5
4
5
4
2
4
4

5
3

6
6
6

5
5
5
5
o
5
6
5
5
6
4
6
6

3
3

3
5
3
4
4
4

__6

5.5
.51

4
5

4
5
3

4
5
5
5
5
4
5

5
5

5

4
5

4

5

5
4
5
5
4
5

4
4

5
4
3
4

5

Quant.

5
4

4
4
5

3
4

3
3

4.0
.67

4.5
.74
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